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CASE COMMENTS
Virginia specifically denied public employees the right to strike, a
summary of their plight is found. The attorney general pointed out
that public employees have struggled from early times to improve
their working conditions, wages, and hours of labor with history
recording the fact that public employers at every turn in the early
days attempted to thwart their efforts. Only the necessity of main-
taining a labor supply, public opinion, and the concessions won by
private employees forced the public employer to grant more favor-
able employment conditions.26
True, some concessions have been won by public employees, but
the rate of their victories has been painfully slow. To a large extent,
their progress remains blocked by the board common law rule which
prohibits all public employees from engaging in a strike. The rule
still stands despite numerous court tests. Even the theories for the
rule, illogical though they may be, continue to survive with tenacity.
The states which have dealt with the problem of public employee
strikes have merely codified the common law prohibition. The
deterrent effect of such statutes has been negligible. All urgings to
adopt a common sense approach by denying the right to strike to
only those public employees engaged in services vital to the com-
munity's health and safety have gone unheeded. A rule of law which
denies the right to strike to all public employees is no more equitable
than a criminal law statute which calls for the same punishment
irrespective of the crime. But, only when this is realized can the
public employee hope to gain any of the rights which have long
been protected and enjoyed by the private worker.
Peter Thomas Denny
Parental Immunity-Its Application and Future
P, an unemancipated infant, brought an action by his next friend
and mother seeking to recover from D, his father, damages for per-
sonal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Evidence sur-
rounding the mishap was conflicting and disputed. The jury however
evidently believed P's version. P testified that he was driving since
his father was intoxicated. D had been asleep in the front seat of
the car but was subsequently awakened by a bump in the road.
28 49 Ops. W. VA. ATT'y GEN. 448, 449 (1962).
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Immediately, D gave his son P a "wild look," grabbed the steering
wheel and concurrently placed his foot on the accelerator. Due to the
increased speed of the trunk and P's inability to overpower his father,
P lost control of the truck, collided with an automobile and ran
against a tree. P proceeded on a theory that his injuries were caused
by the wilful, reckless and wanton conduct of his father; therefore,
P contended that D, even though his father, was not immune from
the action. Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury upon the
question of wilful, reckless and wanton conduct of D. The jury
rendered a verdict in favor of P for $75,000 and judgment was
entered for that amount. From that judgment D appealed. Held,
reversed and remanded. The evidence adduced showed acts consti-
tuting negligence, not wilful and wanton conduct. Consequently, it
was reversable error to give the instruction on the question of wilful,
reckless and wanton conduct. And, since an unemancipated child
cannot maintain an action against his parent for more negligence, P
did not establish a cause of action. Groves v. Groves, 158 S.E.2d
710 (W. Va. 1968).
Before one can successfully pursue an action against another for
the latter's tortious conduct it must generally be shown that there was
a duty owing to the injured party, a breach of that duty and that the
injury to the person was caused by such breach. Yet, when the
injured party happens to be a child and the tort-feasor is that child's
parent, recovery for the injuries involved may be denied. The well
established rule persists that an unemancipated child cannot maintain
a tort action against his parent.1 This rule evolves from the doctrine
of parental immunity.
The genesis of the doctrine of parental immunity is found in the
Mississippi case of Hewlett v. George.2 Prior to that case, American
authority on the matter was "meager, conflicting, and obscure."'
Conspicuously lacking supporting authority, the court in Hewlett
advanced two primary arguments to substantiate its holding that a
child was precluded from recovering against his parent for false
imprisonment: to allow such recovery would obstruct effective
exercise of parental control and, the harmony of the family unit would
be seriously invaded if such actions were sanctioned. The holding
1 Parental immunity is sustained by the majority. Annot., 19 A.L.R. 2d
423 (1951).
2 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
3 McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HAnv. L.
Bv. 1030, 1059 (1930).
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of the Mississippi court seemed rather innoculous since the tort
involved was not serious, nor were the child's injuries longlasting.
Yet, strict adherence to the doctrine thereafter precipitated grave
injustices. Most illustrative of the possible evils incident to a blind
application of parental immunity was the much criticized case of
Roller v. Roller.4 There an unemancipated daughter had been brut-
ally raped by her father.
Thus, Roller graphically revealed that parental immunity could not
be universally applied without regard to attendant circumstances.
Accordingly, courts began to modify the application of the doctrine.5
This refinement of parental immunity is linked to an examination of
the traditional rationales6 advanced in support of the disallowance
of intra-family tort actions. For example, if the disallowance of a
tort action by a child against his parent was predicated upon a desire
to abstain from interfering with a parent's control over his child,
such was not necessary when the parent was acting in a non-parental
capacity. Consequently, some courts have held that if a parent, while
engaged in vocational activity, injures his child in such a way as to
give rise to a cause of action, the rights of the injured child should
not be obviated since a non-parental transaction was involved.7 But,
4 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
5 Serious attack on the doctrine of parental immunity was signaled by
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930). There a child was in-
jured by a parent who at the time of the injury was acting in a vocational
capacity. The importance of this case is marked by its refutation of common
law precedent for the doctrine of parental immunity. Prior to this case it was
generally believed that at common law a child could not maintain a tort
action against his parent. The court pointed out however that such common
law immunity extended only to tort actions by a wife against her husband.
6 Professor McCurdy in Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations,
supra note 3, examines in detail the various reasons given for upholding
parental non-liability. Generally, the reasons he sets forth are as follows:
(1) the danger of fraud incident to such actions; (2) the succession to
e money of the child by the parent if the child dies intestate which would
result in alloving the parent to retrieve money previously acquired by the
child in an action against the parent; (3) the depletion of the family's estate
and thus taking it from other children; (4) the analogous situation where a
wife is not allowed to sue her husband; (5) the maintenance of domestic
tranquility; and (6) security of the parent's discipline and control.
7 Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Borst v.
Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). The court in Signs v. Signs,
supra at 748, compared the accepted principle that a child can maintain an
action against his parent for the childs property rights with the rule of im-
munity relating to tort actions by the child and stated: "It seems absurd to
say that it is legal and proper for an unemancipated child to bring an action
against his parent concerning the child's property rights yet to be utterly
without redress with reference to injury to his person." The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals had language to the same effect in Lusk v. Lusk,
113 W. V. 17, 19, 166 SE. 538, 539 (1932): "It is familiar law that a child
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if preservation of family unity be the central-most theme to parental
immunity, it seems that whether the father is engaged in a vocational
or parental capacity would be immaterial. Nice "vocational distinc-
tions" would be meaningless to a child and his parent.'
In addition to those decisions based on the type of parental activity,
whether vocational or otherwise, other courts have reached the same
result by emphasizing the nature of the parent's conduct. Specifically,
where the parent was guilty of wilful and wanton conduct, rather than
mere negligence, the immunity doctrine would not protect the of-
fending parent.9 Similarly, where the parent's conduct was of a
malicious nature, designed to inflict intentional harm, immunity has
been set aside.'" Other notable exceptions relate to a situation when
family unity could not possibly be disrupted: the accident giving
rise to the child's suit against his parent resulted in the death of the
parent. In that event actions against the estate of the deceased parent
have been allowed."
The most significant attack on the doctrine of parental immunity
has resulted from the knowledge that an ever increasing number of
parents carry liability insurance. The presence of the insurance factor
is most evident in those cases dealing with automobile accidents and
subsequent injury to the driver's child. Courts espousing the abroga-
tion of immunity when injury results from an activity generally
covered by insurance admit that the presence of insurance should
not create a cause of action where one otherwise did not exist.
Nonetheless, these courts reason that parental immunity is strictly
a policy matter, and that the efficacy of such policy should be tested
in light of the widespread presence of liability insurance.' 2 And,
may bring to account the parent for vrongful disposition of the child's own
property. It must not be said that courts are more considerate of the
property of the child than of its person (when unaffected by the family
relationship)."
" "We are not impressed with the idea that ills accredited to such
actions may be obviated merely by suing the parent in his business capacity."
Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 18, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
9 See, e.g., Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956);
Teramano v. Teramano, 1 Ohio App.2d 504, 255 N.E.2d 586 (1965), com-
mented on in 68 W. VA. L. REv. 106 (1965).
1o Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
" See, e.g., Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965). The
holding in this case is also important for its observation that parental im-
munity is a court made doctrine and therefore need not be left to the
legislatures to alter. Moreover, the court in this case seemed to be ad-
vocating a complete abrogation of the doctrine although it expressly confined
itself to the situation incident to a suit against a parent's estate.
12 See, e.g., Baits v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
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if the parent possesses insurance coverage, surely unity would not
be disrupted nor would the family estate be depleted by allowing the
child to maintain a tort action against his parent. 3
The decision in the principal case reaffirmed the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appears adherence to the doctrine of parental
immunity. Although clearly intimating a contrary result would follow
had the defendant father been guilty of wilful or wanton conduct,1"
the court disallowed an unemancipated child recovery when the
parent was merely negligent. As a result, the court's position was
not altered from that taken in the 1931 case of Securo v. Securo.1
In that case the court also indicated that a parent's immunity might
be denied if wilful and wanton conduct were shown." It was
possibly this earlier indication in Securo that led P in the instant
case not to rely on the showing of mere negligence."7 In the future,
however, it might be advisable to attack the doctrine of parental im-
munity directly rather than attempting to draw the fine distinction
between mere negligence and wilful, reckless and wanton conduct."
A direct attack on the doctrine would be particularly appropriate
in view of the more recent cases confronting the problem in other
jurisdictions. The most significant approach is that taken by the
Wisconsin court in Goller v. White."9 There an unemancipated child
was injured by the negligent operation of a farm tractor. After
reviewing the policy upon which parental immunity is founded, the
13 Whether or not the defendant parent was covered by insurance in
the particular case would not be important as such; rather the universal
coverage of insurance would be a factor affecting the doctrine of parental
immunity generally. This would be especially the situation regarding auto-
mobile accidents and injury to the driver's children. For a complete discus-
sion of this matter see 8 ST. Louis UNIv. L.J. 247 (1967).
14 The court said that "As the evidence shows mere negligence but
not wilful and wanton conduct by the defendant, this case is within the
rule of parental immunity. Groves v. Groves, 158 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va.
1968).
15 110 W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931).
16 Id. at 2, 751.
17 The court at two different places emphasized that the plaintiff was
proceeding on the theory that the defendant's conduct was wilful and wanton.
Groves v. Groves, 158 S.E.2d 710, 711 and at 713 (W. Va. 1968).
18 The court itself recognizes the difficulties incident to drawing such
a distinction. Groves v. Groves, 158 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1968) citing Kelly
v. Checker White Cab, Inc., 131 W. Va. 816, 50 S.E.2d 888 (1948). At
least one writer has pointed out that the difference between wilful and
wanton conduct and mere negligence is a "slender reed" on which to hang
a doctrine of immunity. 1962 UNIv. oF Ini. L. F. 557.
19 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963), Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d
8 (Alas. 1967).
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court concluded the doctrine was wholly unsupportable in negligence
cases except in two instances: (1) where the alleged negligent act
involves an exercise of parental authority over the child, and (2)
where the alleged negligent conduct involves an exercise of ordinary
parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing,
housing, medical and dental services, and other care.
Parental immunity can serve a very real purpose when one con-
siders the multitude of occasions in family life when a parent must
act without fear of possible court action by his child. The problem
is particularly acute in circumstances evidenced by the principal case
-separated parents and natural jealousy of the other's control over
the child in a split house." Nonetheless, parental immunity should
not be given as a reward to one simply because he happens to be
a parent. Immunity should be granted one not because he is a
parent but because, as a parent, "he pursues a course within his
household which society exacts of him.' Therefore, non-liability
should be granted as a means to enable the parent to effectively dis-
charge these duties so exacted. It is for this reason that the
decision of the Wisconsin court in Goller v. White" is most logical.
As was shown, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was
not presented the opportunity to re-examine the policy of parental
immunity. Presently, then, the law in West Virginia is that an
unemancipated child cannot recover for the mere negligent conduct
of his parent. Moreover, the court suggests that the non-liability of
a parent would be removed if the parents conduct was wilful, reckless
and wanton. Earlier the court held parental immunity inapplicable
where the child was injured in the parent's vocational capacity and
the father had insurance coverage. 3 In the future, the West Virginia
Court may have an opportunity to re-examine the basic policy de-
cision behind parental immunity if the doctrine is attacked directly.
Thomas Ryan Goodwin
20 The case disclosed that the mother brought the action initially with-
out the knowledge of the infant son. Groves v. Groves, 158 S.E.d 710
(W. Va. 1968).
21 Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 305, 218 P.2d 445, 455 (1950).
22 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
23 Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Morgan v. Leuck, 137 W. Va. 546,
72 S.E.2d 825 (1952), said Lusk v. Lusk, supra, had weakened the holding
in Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931).
[Vol. 70
6
Submission to West Virginia Law Review
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
